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Perception	  and	  the	  External	  World	  Declan	  Smithies	  	  This	  paper	  begins	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  perception	  plays	  an	  epistemic	  role	  in	  justifying	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  to	  explain	  how	  perception	  succeeds	  in	  playing	  this	  epistemic	  role.	  What	  is	  it	  about	  perception	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  it	  justifies	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world?	  The	  debate	  between	  internalism	  and	  externalism	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  perception	  can	  be	  defined	  in	  many	  different	  ways,	  but	  one	  key	  point	  of	  contention	  is	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  phenomenal	  character.	  This	  is	  my	  main	  focus	  here.	  So	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper,	  internalism	  is	  the	  thesis	  that	  perception	  justifies	  belief	  solely	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  phenomenal	  character,	  while	  externalism	  is	  the	  thesis	  that	  perception	  justifies	  belief	  at	  least	  partly	  in	  virtue	  of	  externalist	  facts	  about	  perception	  that	  are	  distinct	  from	  its	  phenomenal	  character.	  Proponents	  of	  internalism	  and	  externalism,	  so	  defined,	  can	  agree	  that	  perception	  justifies	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world,	  but	  they	  disagree	  about	  how	  it	  does	  so.	  This	  paper	  represents	  something	  of	  a	  change	  in	  view.	  Although	  I	  have	  defended	  internalism	  in	  previous	  work,	  this	  paper	  makes	  a	  modest	  concession	  to	  externalism.1	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  my	  goal	  is	  argue	  that	  externalism	  can	  depart	  from	  the	  letter	  of	  internalism	  while	  retaining	  much	  of	  its	  spirit.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  propose	  a	  
moderate	  version	  of	  externalism	  on	  which	  externalist	  facts	  play	  a	  justifying	  role,	  but	  only	  insofar	  as	  they	  impact	  on	  the	  representational	  content	  of	  perception.	  This	  is	  to	  be	  contrasted	  with	  more	  radical	  versions	  of	  externalism	  on	  which	  externalist	  facts	  about	  perception	  play	  a	  justifying	  role	  that	  need	  not	  be	  reflected	  in	  its	  representational	  content.	  The	  main	  goal	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  to	  explain	  why	  a	  modest	  concession	  to	  externalism	  need	  not	  open	  the	  floodgates	  to	  more	  radical	  versions	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  Smithies	  2006	  and	  2014,	  I	  defend	  an	  internalist	  theory	  on	  which	  justification	  depends	  upon	  phenomenal	  character	  alone.	  To	  avoid	  false	  advertising,	  I	  should	  note	  that	  the	  proposal	  defended	  in	  this	  paper	  qualifies	  as	  internalism	  by	  many	  familiar	  definitions,	  including	  mentalism	  and	  access	  internalism.	  
	   2	  
externalism.	  More	  specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  epistemic	  level-­‐bridging	  principles	  provide	  a	  principled	  rationale	  for	  keeping	  the	  floodgates	  closed.	  The	  first	  four	  sections	  of	  the	  paper	  examine	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perception	  and	  its	  justifying	  role.	  Section	  one	  argues	  that	  phenomenal	  character	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  perception	  to	  justify	  belief.	  Section	  two	  argues	  that	  phenomenal	  character	  is	  a	  difference-­‐maker	  for	  perceptual	  justification	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  any	  difference	  in	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perception	  makes	  for	  some	  corresponding	  difference	  in	  its	  justifying	  role.	  Section	  three	  argues	  that	  phenomenal	  character	  is	  not	  the	  only	  difference-­‐maker	  for	  perceptual	  justification,	  since	  its	  justifying	  role	  can	  differ	  with	  no	  corresponding	  difference	  in	  its	  phenomenal	  character.	  Section	  four	  presents	  a	  moderate	  version	  of	  externalism	  on	  which	  phenomenal	  character	  is	  fundamental	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  factor	  in	  determining	  the	  justifying	  role	  of	  perception.	  The	  last	  two	  sections	  of	  the	  paper	  address	  a	  challenge	  for	  this	  view.	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  this	  moderate	  version	  of	  externalism	  is	  a	  stable	  compromise	  between	  internalism	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  more	  radical	  versions	  of	  externalism	  on	  the	  other.	  My	  response	  invokes	  epistemic	  level-­‐bridging	  principles.	  Section	  five	  argues	  that	  epistemic	  level-­‐bridging	  principles	  are	  in	  tension	  with	  radical	  versions	  of	  externalism,	  while	  section	  six	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  tension	  with	  moderate	  versions.	  I	  conclude	  that	  moderate	  externalism	  is	  a	  stable	  compromise	  that	  avoids	  the	  objections	  to	  internalism	  without	  compromising	  the	  motivations	  for	  rejecting	  radical	  externalism.	  A	  few	  clarifications	  before	  I	  begin.	  First,	  this	  paper	  is	  exclusively	  concerned	  with	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  perception	  as	  a	  source	  of	  rational	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world	  as	  distinct	  from	  its	  role	  as	  a	  source	  of	  knowledge.2	  Second,	  it	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  justification	  in	  the	  forward-­‐looking	  sense	  rather	  than	  the	  backward-­‐looking	  sense	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  hold	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I	  assume	  for	  now	  that	  knowledge	  is	  factive,	  while	  justification	  is	  non-­‐factive.	  In	  section	  four,	  I	  argue	  against	  the	  view	  that	  justification	  is	  factive	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  conflicts	  with	  epistemic	  level-­‐bridging	  principles.	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beliefs	  and	  other	  doxastic	  attitudes	  regardless	  of	  how	  or	  whether	  one	  holds	  them.3	  Third,	  I	  want	  to	  bracket	  the	  justifying	  role	  of	  background	  beliefs	  in	  order	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  justifying	  role	  of	  perception	  itself.	  So,	  for	  these	  purposes,	  the	  justifying	  role	  of	  perception	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  role	  in	  providing	  defeasible	  and	  non-­‐
inferential	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world.4	  	  
1. The	  Phenomenal	  Condition	  Normal	  human	  perception	  has	  phenomenal	  character:	  it	  is	  conscious	  in	  the	  phenomenal	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  something	  it	  is	  like	  for	  the	  subject	  to	  perceive	  the	  external	  world.5	  But	  perception	  does	  not	  need	  phenomenal	  character	  in	  order	  to	  represent	  the	  external	  world.	  In	  blindsight,	  for	  example,	  there	  can	  be	  representation	  and	  processing	  of	  perceptual	  information	  about	  stimuli	  in	  the	  subject’s	  blind	  field	  that	  has	  no	  phenomenal	  character	  at	  all.6	  This	  explains	  why	  subjects	  with	  blindsight	  can	  perform	  reliably	  in	  forced	  choice	  tasks	  –	  for	  instance,	  identifying	  a	  letter	  as	  an	  ‘X’	  or	  an	  ‘O’	  and	  categorizing	  a	  line	  as	  horizontal	  or	  vertical	  –	  even	  when	  the	  stimulus	  is	  presented	  in	  the	  subject’s	  blind	  field.	  Now	  the	  question	  arises	  whether	  perception	  must	  have	  phenomenal	  character	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  Does	  unconscious	  perception	  in	  blindsight,	  for	  example,	  provide	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world?	  Intuitively,	  the	  answer	  is	  no:	  blindsight	  no	  more	  justifies	  beliefs	  about	  objects	  in	  the	  blind	  field	  than	  conscious	  sight	  justifies	  beliefs	  about	  objects	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  distinction	  is	  standard,	  although	  the	  terminology	  varies.	  Compare	  Firth’s	  1978	  distinction	  between	  propositional	  and	  doxastic	  senses	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  Goldman’s	  1979	  distinction	  between	  ex	  ante	  and	  ex	  post	  senses	  of	  justification.	  4	  I	  assume	  that	  perception	  provides	  justification	  that	  is	  non-­‐inferential	  at	  least	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  empirical	  justification	  to	  believe	  anything	  else.	  But	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  view	  that	  perception	  provides	  justification	  that	  depends	  upon	  a	  priori	  or	  default	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  perception	  is	  reliable.	  5	  See	  Block	  1997	  for	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  phenomenal	  sense	  and	  various	  functionally	  defined	  senses	  of	  consciousness,	  including	  access	  consciousness	  and	  metacognitive	  consciousness.	  6	  See	  Weiskrantz	  1997	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  empirical	  work	  on	  blindsight.	  Patients	  with	  type-­‐1	  blindsight	  report	  no	  visual	  experience,	  whereas	  patients	  with	  type-­‐2	  blindsight	  report	  some	  degraded	  visual	  experience,	  so	  we	  can	  focus	  on	  cases	  where	  visual	  experience	  is	  entirely	  lacking.	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outside	  the	  field	  of	  view.	  I	  propose	  that	  this	  intuitive	  datum	  is	  best	  explained	  by	  the	  following	  condition:	  	  
The	  Phenomenal	  Condition:	  perception	  justifies	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  has	  some	  phenomenal	  character.	  	  The	  Phenomenal	  Condition	  explains	  the	  epistemic	  asymmetry	  between	  normal	  conscious	  perception	  and	  unconscious	  perception	  in	  blindsight.	  Anyone	  who	  rejects	  the	  Phenomenal	  Condition	  must	  either	  dispute	  the	  intuitive	  datum	  to	  be	  explained	  or	  explain	  it	  in	  some	  other	  way.	  Let	  us	  consider	  these	  options	  in	  turn.	  The	  intuition	  that	  unconscious	  perception	  in	  blindsight	  does	  not	  justify	  belief	  can	  be	  supported	  with	  an	  argument	  of	  the	  following	  kind:	  	   (1) If	  unconscious	  perception	  in	  blindsight	  provides	  justification	  for	  belief,	  then	  blindsighted	  subjects	  are	  less	  than	  fully	  justified	  insofar	  as	  they	  refrain	  from	  forming	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  unconscious	  perception.	  (2) Blindsighted	  subjects	  do	  in	  fact	  refrain	  from	  forming	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  unconscious	  perception.	  (3) But	  blindsighted	  subjects	  are	  fully	  justified	  in	  so	  refraining.	  Therefore,	  (4) Unconscious	  perception	  in	  blindsight	  does	  not	  provide	  justification	  for	  belief.	  	  The	  first	  premise	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  more	  general	  principle	  that	  being	  justified	  in	  the	  epistemic	  domain	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  regulating	  one’s	  beliefs	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  appropriately	  responsive	  to	  whatever	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe.	  The	  second	  premise	  is	  just	  an	  empirical	  observation	  that	  subjects	  with	  blindsight	  do	  not	  in	  fact	  form	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  unconscious	  perception,	  but	  tend	  instead	  to	  regard	  their	  reports	  under	  forced	  choice	  conditions	  as	  mere	  guesswork	  and	  to	  express	  surprise	  when	  informed	  of	  their	  reliability.	  The	  third	  premise	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  blindsight	  –	  just	  like	  ordinary	  blindness	  –	  is	  a	  deficit	  in	  perception,	  rather	  than	  cognition.	  It	  is	  not	  that	  these	  subjects	  have	  a	  cognitive	  deficit	  that	  disables	  them	  from	  responding	  appropriately	  to	  perceptual	  sources	  of	  justification.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  lacking	  these	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perceptual	  sources	  of	  justification	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  And	  so	  we	  arrive	  at	  the	  conclusion	  that	  unconscious	  perception	  in	  blindsight	  provides	  no	  justification	  for	  belief.	  This	  explains	  why	  blindsighted	  subjects	  are	  justified	  in	  refraining	  from	  forming	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  unconscious	  perception.	  One	  objection	  to	  the	  argument	  exploits	  a	  loophole	  in	  the	  first	  premise.	  It	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  perception	  provides	  justification	  that	  is	  defeasible	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  can	  be	  defeated	  by	  doubts	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  perception.7	  And	  so	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  unconscious	  perception	  in	  blindsight	  provides	  justification	  for	  belief	  that	  is	  defeated	  by	  the	  doubts	  that	  blindsighted	  subjects	  have	  about	  their	  own	  reliability.	  In	  this	  way,	  perhaps	  we	  can	  explain	  why	  blindsighted	  subjects	  resist	  forming	  beliefs	  about	  objects	  in	  the	  blind	  field	  without	  casting	  aspersions	  on	  their	  epistemic	  credentials.	  This	  objection	  raises	  the	  question	  whether	  blindsighted	  subjects	  have	  justification	  to	  doubt	  their	  own	  reliability.	  If	  not,	  then	  their	  doubts	  do	  not	  absolve	  them	  from	  epistemic	  criticism,	  but	  merely	  reinforce	  those	  epistemic	  criticisms.	  So	  the	  objection	  relies	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  their	  doubts	  are	  justified.	  But	  if	  so,	  then	  what	  justifies	  them?	  I’ll	  revisit	  this	  question	  below,	  but	  my	  contention	  is	  that	  doubts	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  blindsight	  are	  justified	  because	  unconscious	  perception	  does	  not	  reveal	  itself	  through	  introspection.	  Even	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  blindsight	  is	  reliable,	  there	  is	  always	  room	  for	  justified	  doubt	  about	  whether	  one	  has	  a	  reliable	  capacity	  for	  blindsight,	  since	  blindsight	  does	  not	  reveal	  itself	  upon	  reflection.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  epistemic	  level-­‐bridging	  principles,	  this	  undermines	  the	  claim	  that	  unconscious	  perception	  in	  blindsight	  provides	  justification	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  A	  more	  straightforward	  response	  is	  to	  defuse	  the	  objection	  by	  abstracting	  away	  from	  the	  doubts	  that	  blindsighted	  subjects	  often	  have	  about	  their	  own	  reliability.	  Of	  course,	  they	  can	  be	  convinced	  of	  their	  own	  reliability	  –	  for	  example,	  by	  learning	  the	  results	  of	  experimental	  testing.	  In	  that	  case,	  they	  acquire	  inductive	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  their	  guesses	  are	  now	  likely	  to	  be	  true	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  they	  were	  reliably	  true	  in	  the	  past.	  But	  this	  inductive	  justification	  does	  not	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See	  McDowell	  1982	  for	  a	  dissenting	  view.	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its	  source	  in	  unconscious	  perception	  as	  distinct	  from	  empirically	  justified	  beliefs	  about	  their	  own	  reliability	  in	  the	  circumstances.	  In	  contrast,	  conscious	  perception	  provides	  non-­‐inferential	  justification	  for	  belief	  that	  cannot	  be	  explained	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  empirically	  justified	  beliefs	  about	  one’s	  reliability	  in	  the	  circumstances.	  As	  I	  will	  explain	  below,	  the	  same	  is	  not	  plausibly	  true	  of	  blindsight.	  Consider	  Block’s	  (1997)	  hypothetical	  super-­‐blindsighter	  who	  forms	  beliefs	  automatically	  and	  non-­‐inferentially	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  unconscious	  perception	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  normal	  subjects	  form	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  conscious	  perceptual	  experience.8	  Does	  the	  super-­‐blindsighter	  (we’ll	  call	  her	  Susan)	  have	  justification	  to	  form	  beliefs	  about	  objects	  in	  the	  blind	  field	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  unconscious	  perception?	  Intuitively,	  she	  does	  not.	  Either	  Susan	  is	  justified	  by	  beliefs	  about	  her	  own	  reliability	  or	  she	  is	  merely	  reliable,	  but	  not	  justified.	  In	  either	  case,	  her	  unconscious	  perception	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  source	  of	  justification	  for	  belief.	  The	  epistemic	  predicament	  of	  Susan	  the	  super-­‐blindsighter	  is	  closely	  parallel	  to	  that	  of	  BonJour’s	  clairvoyant,	  Norman:	  	   Norman,	  under	  certain	  conditions	  which	  usually	  obtain,	  is	  a	  completely	  reliable	  clairvoyant	  with	  respect	  to	  certain	  kinds	  of	  subject	  matter.	  He	  possesses	  no	  evidence	  or	  reasons	  of	  any	  kind	  for	  or	  against	  the	  general	  possibility	  of	  such	  a	  cognitive	  power	  or	  for	  or	  against	  the	  thesis	  that	  he	  possesses	  it.	  One	  day	  Norman	  comes	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  President	  is	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  though	  he	  has	  no	  evidence	  either	  for	  or	  against	  this	  belief.	  In	  fact	  the	  belief	  is	  true	  and	  results	  from	  his	  clairvoyant	  power	  under	  circumstances	  in	  which	  it	  is	  completely	  reliable.	  (BonJour	  1985:	  41)	  	  Intuitively,	  Norman	  has	  no	  justification	  to	  form	  beliefs	  about	  the	  location	  of	  the	  President	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  reliable	  faculty	  of	  clairvoyance.	  By	  parity	  of	  reasoning,	  Susan	  has	  no	  justification	  to	  form	  beliefs	  about	  objects	  in	  the	  blind	  field	  on	  the	  basis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  One	  qualification:	  Block’s	  super-­‐blindsighter	  is	  “trained	  to	  prompt	  himself	  at	  will,	  guessing	  without	  being	  told	  to	  guess”	  (1997:	  385).	  But	  we	  can	  stipulate	  instead	  that	  he	  forms	  beliefs	  spontaneously	  without	  any	  need	  for	  self-­‐prompting.	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of	  her	  reliable	  faculty	  of	  unconscious	  perception.	  However,	  these	  intuitive	  reactions	  can	  be	  challenged	  and	  so	  it	  is	  worthwhile	  to	  consider	  how	  we	  might	  support	  them	  with	  further	  argument.9	  The	  argument	  that	  I	  propose	  relies	  on	  an	  epistemic	  level-­‐bridging	  principle:	  	  
Level	  Bridging:	  One	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  be	  clear	  about	  what	  this	  principle	  says.	  It	  doesn’t	  say	  that	  one’s	  first-­‐order	  beliefs	  are	  justified	  if	  and	  only	  if	  they	  are	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  justified	  higher-­‐order	  beliefs	  about	  what	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe.	  It	  doesn’t	  say	  that	  one’s	  first-­‐order	  beliefs	  are	  justified	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  an	  infinite	  hierarchy	  of	  justified	  higher-­‐order	  beliefs.	  It	  just	  says	  that	  one	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  higher-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification.	  And	  here	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  undefeated,	  all	  things	  considered	  justification	  in	  the	  forward-­‐looking	  sense.10	  The	  argument	  from	  Level	  Bridging	  takes	  the	  following	  form.	  Bonjour	  stipulates	  that	  Norman	  has	  no	  evidence	  that	  justifies	  believing	  that	  he	  has	  a	  reliable	  faculty	  of	  clairvoyance.	  So	  presumably	  Norman	  lacks	  higher-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification	  to	  form	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  clairvoyance.	  Given	  Level	  Bridging,	  it	  follows	  that	  Norman	  lacks	  first-­‐order	  justification	  to	  form	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  clairvoyance.	  Similarly,	  we	  can	  stipulate	  that	  Susan	  has	  no	  evidence	  that	  justifies	  believing	  that	  she	  has	  a	  reliable	  faculty	  of	  unconscious	  perception.	  Therefore,	  Susan	  lacks	  higher-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  she	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification	  to	  form	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  unconscious	  perception.	  And	  Level	  Bridging	  implies,	  once	  again,	  that	  Susan	  lacks	  first-­‐order	  justification	  to	  form	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  unconscious	  perception.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See	  Lyons	  2009:	  Ch.5	  for	  opposing	  verdicts	  about	  clairvoyance-­‐style	  cases.	  10	  In	  Smithies	  2012a,	  I	  use	  these	  points	  in	  defending	  the	  level-­‐bridging	  principles	  against	  the	  charge	  of	  over-­‐intellectualization	  and	  psychological	  regress	  problems.	  See	  also	  Smithies	  2012c	  for	  my	  response	  to	  Williamson’s	  anti-­‐luminosity	  argument.	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One	  option	  is	  to	  block	  the	  argument	  by	  rejecting	  Level	  Bridging.	  On	  this	  view,	  Norman	  and	  Susan	  have	  first-­‐order	  justification	  for	  their	  beliefs,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  have	  higher-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  have	  first-­‐order	  justification.	  As	  I	  will	  explain,	  however,	  this	  view	  has	  some	  implausible	  consequences.	  The	  first	  implausible	  consequence	  is	  that	  people	  sometimes	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  Moorean	  conjunctions	  that	  intuitively	  no	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe.	  Let’s	  suppose,	  just	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  argument,	  that	  Susan	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  an	  X	  in	  her	  blind	  field,	  although	  she	  lacks	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  she	  has	  justification.	  Which	  doxastic	  attitude	  does	  she	  have	  justification	  to	  adopt	  towards	  the	  proposition	  that	  she	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  an	  X	  in	  her	  blind	  field?	  If	  she	  lacks	  justification	  to	  believe	  it,	  then	  she	  must	  have	  justification	  either	  to	  disbelieve	  it	  or	  to	  withhold	  belief.	  But	  then	  she	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  one	  of	  the	  following	  Moorean	  conjunctions:	  	   (1) There	  is	  an	  X	  in	  my	  blind	  field,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  this.	  (2) There	  is	  an	  X	  in	  my	  blind	  field,	  but	  it	  is	  an	  open	  question	  whether	  I	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  this.	  	  Intuitively,	  however,	  anyone	  who	  believes	  these	  Moorean	  conjunctions	  is	  thereby	  unjustified.	  And	  this	  is	  because	  no	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  them.11	  The	  second	  implausible	  consequence	  is	  that	  people	  can	  have	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  that	  do	  not	  have	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  survive	  a	  fully	  justified	  process	  of	  critical	  reflection.	  Critical	  reflection	  is	  the	  activity	  of	  reflecting	  on	  which	  beliefs	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  hold	  and	  revising	  one’s	  beliefs	  accordingly.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  activity	  is	  to	  bring	  one’s	  first-­‐order	  beliefs	  into	  line	  with	  one’s	  higher-­‐order	  reflections	  about	  which	  beliefs	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  hold.	  Critical	  reflection	  is	  fully	  justified	  when	  one’s	  first-­‐order	  beliefs	  are	  brought	  into	  line	  with	  justified	  higher-­‐order	  reflections.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See	  Smithies	  2012a	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  version	  of	  this	  argument.	  Bergmann	  2005	  and	  Littlejohn	  2013	  argue	  (to	  put	  the	  point	  in	  my	  terminology)	  that	  justification	  for	  believing	  Moorean	  conjunctions	  is	  “finkish”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  destroyed	  in	  process	  of	  believing	  them.	  See	  Smithies	  2012a:	  16-­‐20	  for	  my	  response.	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So	  when	  it	  is	  fully	  justified,	  critical	  reflection	  results	  in	  belief	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  higher-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification	  for	  that	  belief.	  Susan’s	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  an	  X	  in	  her	  blind	  field	  cannot	  survive	  a	  fully	  justified	  process	  of	  critical	  reflection,	  since	  she	  lacks	  higher-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  she	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification	  for	  that	  belief.	  But	  it	  is	  implausible	  to	  maintain	  that	  she	  has	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  that	  cannot	  survive	  a	  fully	  justified	  process	  of	  critical	  reflection.12	  The	  only	  remaining	  option	  is	  to	  block	  the	  argument	  by	  insisting	  that	  Susan	  has	  not	  only	  first-­‐order	  justification	  for	  her	  beliefs	  but	  also	  higher-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  she	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification.	  But	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  square	  this	  with	  our	  description	  of	  the	  examples.	  We	  stipulated	  that	  Susan	  has	  no	  evidence	  that	  justifies	  believing	  that	  she	  has	  a	  reliable	  faculty	  of	  unconscious	  perception.	  So	  her	  total	  evidence	  justifies	  doubting	  –	  that	  is,	  disbelieving	  or	  withholding	  belief	  –	  that	  she	  has	  any	  such	  reliable	  faculty	  of	  unconscious	  perception.	  But	  any	  body	  of	  evidence	  that	  justifies	  doubting	  the	  reliability	  of	  forming	  beliefs	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  also	  justifies	  doubting	  that	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  form	  beliefs	  in	  that	  way.	  And	  one	  cannot	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  a	  proposition	  while	  also	  having	  justification	  to	  disbelieve	  it	  or	  to	  withhold	  belief.	  Therefore,	  it	  follows	  that	  Susan	  lacks	  higher-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  she	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification	  to	  form	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  unconscious	  perception.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Level	  Bridging	  provides	  argumentative	  support	  for	  the	  intuitive	  datum	  that	  the	  Phenomenal	  Condition	  is	  designed	  to	  explain:	  namely,	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  epistemic	  asymmetry	  between	  conscious	  perception	  and	  blindsight.	  But	  is	  the	  Phenomenal	  Condition	  needed	  for	  explaining	  this	  epistemic	  asymmetry	  or	  can	  we	  explain	  it	  in	  some	  other	  way?	  There	  are	  functional	  differences	  as	  well	  as	  phenomenal	  differences	  between	  conscious	  perception	  and	  blindsight.	  For	  instance,	  unconscious	  perceptual	  information	  in	  blindsight	  is	  not	  access	  conscious	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  poised	  for	  spontaneous	  use	  in	  the	  control	  of	  action,	  reasoning,	  and	  verbal	  report.	  And	  so	  one	  might	  explain	  the	  epistemic	  asymmetry	  as	  follows:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See	  Smithies	  2015	  for	  the	  proposal	  that	  justification	  is	  the	  epistemic	  property	  that	  makes	  a	  belief	  suited	  to	  survive	  a	  fully	  justified	  process	  of	  critical	  reflection.	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The	  Accessibility	  Condition:	  perception	  justifies	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  is	  access	  conscious.	  	  But	  the	  original	  point	  of	  Block’s	  super-­‐blindsight	  case	  was	  to	  show	  that	  perceptual	  information	  could	  be	  access	  conscious	  without	  being	  phenomenally	  conscious.	  And	  yet,	  as	  I	  argued	  above,	  unconscious	  perception	  in	  super-­‐blindsight	  does	  not	  justify	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  One	  reaction	  is	  to	  impose	  a	  more	  demanding	  functional	  condition	  on	  perceptual	  justification.	  For	  instance,	  neither	  blindsight	  nor	  super-­‐blindsight	  is	  
metacognitively	  conscious	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  the	  target	  of	  higher-­‐order	  thoughts	  that	  are	  formed	  directly	  on	  its	  basis	  without	  mediation	  by	  inference	  or	  observation.	  So	  we	  might	  seek	  to	  explain	  the	  epistemic	  asymmetry	  as	  follows:	  	  
The	  Metacognition	  Condition:	  perception	  justifies	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  is	  metacognitively	  conscious.	  	  One	  problem	  is	  that	  this	  more	  demanding	  condition	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  perceptual	  justification,	  since	  children	  and	  animals	  can	  have	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world	  that	  are	  justified	  by	  perception	  without	  having	  beliefs	  about	  their	  own	  perception.	  Another	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient.	  Consider	  the	  hyper-­‐blindsighter	  who	  forms	  beliefs	  of	  two	  kinds	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  unconscious	  perception:	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world	  and	  beliefs	  about	  their	  own	  internal	  states.	  Intuitively,	  the	  latter	  are	  no	  more	  justified	  than	  the	  former.	  If	  reliability	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world,	  then	  why	  should	  it	  be	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  beliefs	  about	  the	  internal	  world?	  But	  we	  cannot	  turn	  unjustified	  beliefs	  into	  justified	  beliefs	  by	  adding	  more	  unjustified	  beliefs.	  These	  examples	  make	  it	  plausible	  that	  unconscious	  perception	  cannot	  provide	  justification	  for	  belief	  however	  much	  we	  elaborate	  its	  functional	  role.	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  functional	  asymmetries	  between	  conscious	  sight	  and	  blindsight	  cannot	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explain	  the	  epistemic	  asymmetry	  between	  them.	  The	  Phenomenal	  Condition	  is	  therefore	  indispensable	  for	  explaining	  this	  epistemic	  asymmetry.	  The	  Phenomenal	  Condition	  can	  be	  further	  motivated	  by	  its	  role	  in	  explaining	  Level	  Bridging.	  Perception	  must	  have	  phenomenal	  character	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  first-­‐order	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  guarantee	  that	  one	  also	  has	  higher-­‐order	  justification.	  Unconscious	  perception	  does	  not	  reveal	  itself	  through	  introspection	  and	  so	  one	  can	  have	  unconscious	  perception	  without	  thereby	  having	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  does.	  That	  is	  why	  subjects	  with	  blindsight	  are	  typically	  justified	  in	  doubting	  their	  own	  reliability,	  since	  they	  lack	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  have	  are	  unconsciously	  representing	  and	  processing	  perceptual	  information.	  Conscious	  experience,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  reveals	  itself	  through	  introspection	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  cannot	  have	  conscious	  experience	  without	  thereby	  having	  introspection	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  does.	  This	  guarantees	  that	  the	  source	  of	  one’s	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world	  is	  always	  accessible	  through	  introspection	  and	  reflection	  alone.13	  	  
2. Phenomenal	  Grounding	  I	  argued	  in	  section	  one	  that	  that	  phenomenal	  character	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  perception	  to	  play	  its	  justifying	  role.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  further	  question	  whether	  perception	  justifies	  belief	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  phenomenal	  character.	  What	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  and	  its	  justifying	  role?	  I	  want	  to	  begin	  by	  distinguishing	  the	  following	  pair	  of	  claims:	  	  
Phenomenal	  Grounding:	  any	  difference	  in	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  grounds	  some	  difference	  in	  its	  justifying	  role.	  	  
Phenomenal	  Dependence:	  any	  difference	  in	  the	  justifying	  role	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  depends	  upon	  some	  difference	  in	  its	  phenomenal	  character.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  See	  Smithies	  2012b	  for	  a	  more	  extended	  discussion	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  consciousness	  and	  introspection	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  defence	  of	  internalism.	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Phenomenal	  Grounding	  is	  the	  thesis	  that	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  a	  difference-­‐maker	  for	  perceptual	  justification,	  whereas	  Phenomenal	  Dependence	  is	  the	  distinct	  thesis	  that	  it	  is	  the	  only	  difference-­‐maker.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  argue	  for	  Phenomenal	  Grounding	  and	  against	  Phenomenal	  Dependence.	  This	  is	  a	  change	  in	  my	  views,	  since	  I	  endorsed	  Phenomenal	  Dependence	  in	  previous	  work.	  My	  argument	  for	  Phenomenal	  Grounding	  is	  that	  it	  follows	  from	  two	  plausible	  and	  widely	  held	  assumptions.	  The	  first	  assumption	  is	  Representationalism:	  	  
Representationalism:	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  identical	  with	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  representational	  content.	  	  Representationalism	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  representational	  content	  that	  is	  identical	  with	  phenomenal	  character.	  Call	  this	  phenomenal	  content.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  all	  representational	  content	  is	  phenomenal	  content.	  Therefore,	  Representationalism	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  unconscious	  perception	  in	  blindsight	  represents	  the	  external	  world.	  It	  merely	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  representational	  content	  –	  namely,	  phenomenal	  content	  –	  that	  requires	  phenomenal	  consciousness.	  There	  is	  a	  vast	  literature	  on	  Representationalism,	  and	  I	  cannot	  do	  justice	  to	  it	  here,	  but	  I	  will	  briefly	  sketch	  one	  compelling	  source	  of	  motivation	  for	  the	  view.	  Consider	  the	  opposing	  view	  that	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  entirely	  independent	  of	  its	  representational	  content.	  This	  seems	  quite	  wrong.	  One	  cannot	  coherently	  imagine	  someone	  whose	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  the	  very	  same	  phenomenal	  character	  as	  one’s	  own	  but	  none	  of	  the	  same	  representational	  content.	  And	  this	  is	  because	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  representational	  content	  that	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  its	  phenomenal	  character.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  the	  visual	  experience	  that	  I	  am	  now	  having	  that	  it	  represents	  that	  there	  is	  a	  mug	  of	  brown	  liquid	  on	  the	  table	  to	  the	  left.	  No	  one	  could	  have	  an	  experience	  with	  just	  the	  same	  phenomenal	  character	  without	  thereby	  representing	  that	  there	  is	  a	  mug	  of	  brown	  liquid	  on	  the	  table	  to	  the	  left.	  The	  simplest	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and	  best	  explanation	  of	  this	  fact	  is	  that	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  just	  is	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  representational	  content.14	  The	  second	  assumption	  in	  the	  argument	  is	  the	  Content	  Principle:	  	  
The	  Content	  Principle:	  one	  has	  defeasible,	  non-­‐inferential	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  with	  the	  representational	  content	  that	  p.15	  	  The	  Content	  Principle	  captures	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  representational	  content	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  relevant	  to	  its	  justifying	  role.	  Consider	  an	  analogy	  with	  testimony.	  What	  you’re	  justified	  in	  believing	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  testimony	  depends	  upon	  the	  content	  of	  the	  testimony	  that	  you	  receive	  –	  that	  is,	  it	  depends	  on	  what	  people	  tell	  you	  (or,	  perhaps	  better,	  on	  what	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  telling	  you).	  Similarly,	  what	  you’re	  justified	  in	  believing	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  depends	  upon	  its	  content	  –	  that	  is,	  it	  depends	  on	  what	  perceptual	  experience	  tells	  you.	  The	  Content	  Principle	  is	  not	  universally	  accepted:	  radical	  versions	  of	  externalism	  claim	  that	  perception	  justifies	  belief	  in	  virtue	  of	  externalist	  facts	  that	  need	  not	  impact	  on	  its	  representational	  content.	  I	  argue	  against	  these	  views	  in	  section	  five,	  but	  for	  now,	  I	  take	  the	  Content	  Principle	  as	  a	  plausible	  starting	  point.16	  The	  Content	  Principle	  is	  stated	  as	  a	  biconditional,	  but	  if	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  is	  understood	  to	  have	  explanatory	  priority,	  then	  it	  implies	  the	  following	  pair	  of	  claims:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  See	  McGinn	  1988,	  Siewert	  1998,	  Horgan	  and	  Tienson	  2002,	  and	  Chalmers	  2004	  for	  related	  arguments.	  See	  also	  Harman	  1990,	  Tye	  1995,	  and	  Byrne	  2001	  for	  arguments	  from	  transparency.	  Peacocke	  1983	  and	  Block	  2003	  raise	  objections	  that	  have	  been	  widely	  discussed	  elsewhere.	  15	  See	  Pryor’s	  2000	  defence	  of	  dogmatism	  and	  Huemer’s	  2001:	  Ch.	  5	  defence	  of	  phenomenal	  conservatism	  for	  related	  principles.	  16	  Silins	  2011	  raises	  objections	  to	  the	  Content	  Principle	  that	  I	  don’t	  have	  space	  to	  discuss	  here,	  including	  a	  version	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  speckled	  hen.	  See	  Smithies	  2012c:	  729-­‐31	  for	  some	  relevant	  discussion.	  
	   14	  
Representational	  Grounding:	  any	  difference	  in	  the	  representational	  content	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  grounds	  some	  corresponding	  difference	  in	  its	  justifying	  role.	  	  
Representational	  Dependence:	  any	  difference	  in	  the	  justifying	  role	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  depends	  upon	  some	  corresponding	  difference	  in	  its	  representational	  content.	  	  Phenomenal	  Grounding	  follows	  from	  the	  combination	  of	  Representationalism	  together	  with	  Representational	  Grounding.	  If	  phenomenal	  character	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  representational	  content,	  and	  if	  representational	  content	  is	  a	  justificational	  difference-­‐maker,	  then	  so	  is	  phenomenal	  character.	  As	  I	  will	  explain,	  however,	  Phenomenal	  Dependence	  cannot	  be	  motivated	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  since	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  Representationalism	  together	  with	  Representational	  Dependence.	  Representationalism	  implies	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  representational	  content	  –	  namely,	  phenomenal	  content	  –	  that	  is	  identical	  with	  its	  phenomenal	  character.	  But	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  further	  claim	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  also	  has	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  representational	  content	  –	  namely,	  externalist	  
content	  –	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  and	  fails	  to	  supervene	  upon	  its	  phenomenal	  character.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  view	  that	  perceptual	  experiences	  with	  the	  same	  phenomenal	  character	  can	  represent	  different	  externalist	  contents	  in	  virtue	  of	  standing	  in	  different	  perceptual	  relations	  to	  the	  external	  world.	  In	  section	  four,	  I	  argue	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  two	  levels	  of	  representational	  content	  –	  that	  is,	  phenomenal	  content	  and	  externalist	  content.17	  Suppose	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  that	  this	  two-­‐level	  theory	  is	  correct.	  The	  Content	  Principle	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  any	  particular	  kind	  of	  representational	  content:	  it	  applies	  to	  both	  phenomenal	  and	  externalist	  contents	  of	  perceptual	  experience.	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  phenomenal	  character	  is	  not	  uniquely	  suited	  to	  play	  an	  epistemic	  role	  in	  grounding	  differences	  in	  perceptual	  justification,	  since	  there	  are	  externalist	  facts	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Two-­‐level	  theories	  of	  the	  representational	  content	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  defended	  by	  Horgan	  and	  Tienson	  2002,	  Chalmers	  2004,	  and	  Siegel	  2011:	  Ch.	  6.	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about	  perception	  that	  also	  play	  a	  difference-­‐making	  role.	  I	  develop	  this	  argument	  against	  Phenomenal	  Dependence	  in	  section	  three	  below.	  	  
3. Against	  Phenomenal	  Dependence	  The	  argument	  against	  Phenomenal	  Dependence	  is	  that	  relational	  facts	  about	  which	  objects	  one	  perceives	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  one’s	  justification	  to	  believe	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  objects.	  We	  can	  therefore	  generate	  counterexamples	  to	  Phenomenal	  Dependence	  in	  which	  phenomenal	  duplicates	  perceive	  distinct	  objects	  and	  thereby	  differ	  in	  which	  de	  re	  propositions	  they	  have	  justification	  to	  believe.	  This	  is	  just	  one	  instance	  of	  a	  more	  general	  phenomenon	  of	  believing	  externalist	  contents,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  good	  test	  case	  to	  focus	  on.	  A	  de	  re	  proposition	  is	  a	  proposition	  about	  an	  object	  that	  no	  subject	  can	  believe	  unless	  the	  object	  exists	  and	  stands	  in	  an	  appropriate	  relation	  –	  such	  as	  a	  perceptual	  relation	  –	  to	  the	  subject.18	  Someone	  who	  hallucinates	  a	  rotten	  apple	  may	  come	  to	  believe	  the	  general	  proposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  rotten	  apple	  in	  their	  environment,	  but	  they	  cannot	  believe	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  any	  particular	  apple	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  is	  rotten,	  since	  there	  is	  no	  such	  apple	  that	  they	  perceive.19	  Similarly,	  someone	  who	  perceives	  a	  rotten	  apple	  can	  believe	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  that	  particular	  apple,	  but	  they	  cannot	  believe	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  numerically	  distinct	  but	  qualitatively	  identical	  apples	  that	  they	  do	  not	  perceive.	  Here	  is	  an	  example	  from	  Davies	  that	  illustrates	  the	  point:	  	   If	  I	  look	  at	  an	  apple,	  Fido,	  and	  think,	  ‘That	  apple	  is	  rotten’,	  and	  you	  look	  at	  a	  numerically	  distinct	  but	  qualitatively	  indistinguishable	  apple,	  Fifi,	  and	  think,	  ‘That	  apple	  is	  rotten’,	  then	  –	  be	  we	  ever	  so	  similar	  internally	  –	  our	  beliefs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  A	  proposition	  is	  de	  re	  (or	  object-­‐dependent)	  with	  respect	  to	  an	  object	  only	  if	  it	  is	  true	  of	  that	  object	  in	  in	  every	  possible	  world	  in	  which	  it	  exists.	  See	  Evans	  1982:	  Ch.6,	  Martin	  2002,	  and	  Siegel	  2011:	  Ch.6.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  focus	  on	  de	  re	  belief	  that	  is	  based	  on	  perception,	  but	  I	  don’t	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  de	  re	  belief	  that	  is	  based	  on	  memory,	  testimony,	  or	  inference.	  19	  Johnston	  points	  out	  that	  “although	  we	  can	  hallucinate	  real	  things	  and	  real	  people,	  no	  such	  hallucination	  can	  provide	  an	  original	  source	  of	  de	  re	  thought	  about	  those	  particular	  things	  or	  people”	  (2004:	  129).	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have	  different	  contents	  in	  virtue	  of	  our	  being	  related	  to	  different	  apples.	  My	  belief,	  concerning	  Fido,	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  is	  rotten,	  is	  a	  belief	  whose	  correctness	  depends	  upon	  how	  things	  are	  with	  Fido:	  whether	  Fido	  is	  indeed	  a	  rotten	  apple.	  Your	  belief,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  one	  whose	  correctness	  is	  indifferent	  to	  how	  things	  are	  with	  Fido,	  but	  depends	  instead	  upon	  how	  things	  are	  with	  Fifi.	  In	  that	  sense,	  the	  contents	  of	  our	  beliefs	  are	  object-­‐involving.	  (Davies	  1997:	  313-­‐4)	  	  We	  can	  stipulate	  that	  you	  and	  I	  are	  intrinsic	  duplicates	  who	  stand	  in	  different	  relations	  to	  the	  external	  world.	  I	  am	  looking	  at	  Fido	  while	  you	  are	  looking	  at	  a	  numerically	  distinct	  but	  qualitatively	  identical	  object,	  Fifi.	  Because	  we	  are	  intrinsic	  duplicates,	  it	  is	  prima	  facie	  plausible	  that	  we	  have	  visual	  experiences	  with	  the	  same	  phenomenal	  character.	  Each	  of	  us	  believes	  the	  general	  proposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  rotten	  apple	  in	  our	  environment.	  In	  addition,	  each	  of	  us	  believes	  a	  de	  re	  proposition	  about	  the	  apple	  in	  our	  own	  environment	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  is	  rotten.	  I	  believe	  a	  de	  re	  proposition	  about	  Fido,	  whereas	  you	  believe	  a	  de	  re	  proposition	  about	  Fifi,	  and	  not	  vice	  versa.	  Moreover,	  we	  can	  assume	  that	  each	  of	  us	  is	  fully	  rational	  and	  hence	  that	  we	  believe	  all	  and	  only	  those	  propositions	  that	  we	  have	  justification	  to	  believe.	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  we	  are	  phenomenal	  duplicates,	  but	  we	  do	  not	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  all	  the	  same	  propositions.	  This	  contradicts	  Phenomenal	  Dependence.	  The	  argument	  can	  be	  summarized	  as	  follows:	  	   (1) You	  and	  I	  are	  phenomenal	  duplicates	  who	  see	  distinct	  objects.	  (2) I	  believe	  the	  de	  re	  proposition	  that	  Fido	  is	  rotten,	  whereas	  you	  believe	  the	  de	  re	  proposition	  that	  Fifi	  is	  rotten,	  and	  not	  vice	  versa.	  (3) You	  and	  I	  are	  fully	  rational	  so	  each	  of	  us	  believes	  every	  proposition	  that	  we	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perceptual	  experience.	  (4) Therefore,	  Phenomenal	  Dependence	  is	  false:	  you	  and	  I	  are	  phenomenal	  duplicates	  but	  we	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  different	  propositions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perceptual	  experience.	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I	  will	  consider	  and	  reject	  three	  strategies	  for	  blocking	  the	  argument	  in	  this	  section	  before	  considering	  the	  implications	  of	  accepting	  its	  conclusion	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  The	  first	  option	  is	  to	  reject	  the	  first	  premise	  by	  denying	  that	  all	  intrinsic	  duplicates	  are	  phenomenal	  duplicates.	  On	  the	  relational	  view	  of	  experience,	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  experience	  in	  a	  case	  of	  veridical	  perception	  consists	  in	  the	  perceptual	  relation	  that	  holds	  between	  the	  subject	  and	  the	  external	  world.20	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  experience	  depends	  not	  just	  on	  intrinsic	  properties	  of	  the	  subject	  but	  on	  extrinsic	  relations	  to	  objects	  in	  the	  external	  world	  –	  in	  particular,	  it	  depends	  on	  which	  objects	  the	  subject	  perceives.	  Intrinsic	  duplicates	  can	  differ	  in	  their	  phenomenal	  character	  if	  they	  are	  perceptually	  related	  to	  distinct	  objects	  (or	  none	  at	  all).	  Moreover,	  the	  resulting	  differences	  in	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  their	  experience	  can	  explain	  the	  relevant	  differences	  in	  which	  de	  re	  propositions	  they	  have	  justification	  to	  believe.	  One	  problem	  for	  the	  relational	  view	  of	  experience	  is	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  transition	  from	  perceiving	  to	  hallucinating	  or	  from	  perceiving	  one	  object	  to	  perceiving	  another	  can	  be	  “experientially	  seamless”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  detected	  through	  introspection.	  As	  Johnston	  (2004:	  122)	  puts	  the	  point,	  “Try	  as	  you	  might,	  you	  would	  not	  notice	  any	  difference,	  however	  closely	  you	  attend	  to	  your	  visual	  experience.”	  The	  standard	  explanation	  is	  that	  the	  transition	  is	  seamless	  because	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  experience	  remains	  constant	  throughout.	  But	  proponents	  of	  the	  relational	  view	  insist	  that	  its	  phenomenal	  character	  changes	  in	  ways	  that	  you’re	  unable	  to	  detect.	  On	  this	  view,	  perceptions	  of	  distinct	  objects	  and	  hallucinations	  can	  share	  the	  negative	  epistemic	  property	  of	  being	  indiscriminable	  from	  veridical	  perception	  of	  a	  particular	  object	  by	  reflection	  alone.	  But	  they	  need	  not	  share	  phenomenal	  character	  in	  a	  more	  fundamental	  sense	  that	  explains	  why	  they	  share	  this	  negative	  epistemic	  property.	  For	  instance,	  Martin	  (2004)	  proposes	  an	  epistemic	  conception	  of	  hallucination	  on	  which	  there	  is	  no	  more	  fundamental	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  This	  view	  is	  sometimes	  called	  “naïve	  realism”.	  Proponents	  include	  Campbell	  2002,	  Martin	  2004,	  Brewer	  2006,	  and	  Fish	  2008.	  One	  can	  deny	  that	  phenomenal	  character	  is	  intrinsic	  without	  endorsing	  the	  relational	  view	  of	  experience,	  but	  this	  would	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  block	  the	  argument.	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property	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  a	  perfect	  hallucination	  is	  indiscriminable	  by	  reflection	  from	  a	  corresponding	  veridical	  perception.21	  The	  epistemic	  conception	  of	  hallucination	  faces	  some	  compelling	  objections.	  For	  instance,	  Siegel	  (2004)	  observes	  that	  two	  experiences	  that	  differ	  in	  their	  phenomenal	  character	  may	  nevertheless	  be	  indiscriminable	  by	  reflection	  because	  the	  subject	  is	  inattentive	  or	  delusional	  or	  incapable	  of	  reflecting	  on	  her	  experiences.	  Martin’s	  (2004)	  reply	  is	  that	  a	  perfect	  hallucination	  is	  indiscriminable	  from	  a	  corresponding	  veridical	  perception	  in	  an	  impersonal	  sense	  that	  abstracts	  away	  from	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  subject’s	  cognitive	  capacities.	  It	  is	  natural	  to	  understand	  this	  proposal	  in	  counterfactual	  terms:	  even	  if	  the	  subject’s	  cognitive	  capacities	  were	  idealized	  in	  the	  relevant	  ways,	  the	  subject	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  discriminate	  a	  perfect	  hallucination	  from	  a	  corresponding	  veridical	  perception	  by	  reflection	  alone.	  But	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  evaluate	  the	  truth	  of	  this	  counterfactual	  without	  holding	  fixed	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  the	  subject’s	  experience.	  The	  epistemic	  conception	  of	  hallucination	  is	  forced	  to	  take	  the	  relevant	  epistemic	  facts	  about	  impersonal	  indiscriminability	  as	  ungrounded	  primitives.	  The	  standard	  view	  is	  superior	  insofar	  as	  it	  explains	  the	  relevant	  epistemic	  facts	  about	  impersonal	  indiscriminability	  in	  terms	  of	  shared	  phenomenal	  character,	  rather	  than	  simply	  taking	  them	  as	  primitive.	  The	  second	  option	  is	  to	  reject	  the	  second	  premise	  of	  the	  argument	  by	  denying	  that	  subjects	  who	  perceive	  distinct	  objects	  also	  believe	  distinct	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  those	  objects.	  In	  the	  example	  above,	  both	  you	  and	  I	  believe	  the	  general	  proposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  rotten	  apple	  in	  our	  environment.	  One	  and	  the	  same	  proposition	  is	  made	  true	  by	  distinct	  apples	  in	  our	  respective	  environments.	  What	  is	  denied	  is	  that	  each	  of	  us	  believes	  a	  de	  re	  proposition	  about	  the	  apple	  in	  our	  own	  environment.	  More	  generally,	  on	  this	  view,	  the	  representational	  content	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  and	  belief	  is	  exclusively	  phenomenal	  content	  that	  supervenes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Martin	  2002	  allows	  that	  perceptions	  of	  numerically	  distinct	  but	  qualitatively	  identical	  objects	  can	  share	  a	  general	  phenomenal	  character	  while	  differing	  in	  their	  particular	  phenomenal	  nature.	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upon	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  the	  subject.	  Farkas	  (2008)	  calls	  this	  view	  “phenomenal	  intentionality	  without	  compromise”.22	  Many	  philosophers	  believe	  that	  some	  representational	  content	  of	  belief	  is	  
externalist	  content	  that	  depends	  not	  just	  on	  the	  intrinsic	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  the	  subject	  but	  also	  on	  the	  subject’s	  extrinsic	  relations	  to	  the	  environment.	  But	  is	  there	  any	  compelling	  reason	  to	  believe	  this?	  Many	  are	  persuaded	  by	  twin-­‐earth	  examples	  in	  which	  phenomenal	  duplicates	  are	  embedded	  in	  different	  environments.23	  But	  intuitions	  about	  cases	  will	  take	  us	  only	  so	  far	  in	  the	  face	  of	  theoretical	  opposition.	  We	  need	  to	  ask	  whether	  there	  is	  any	  theoretical	  role	  for	  externalist	  content	  that	  cannot	  be	  played	  by	  phenomenal	  content	  alone.	  One	  important	  proposal	  is	  that	  externalist	  content	  plays	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  explaining	  relational	  facts	  about	  my	  behavior.	  The	  general	  idea	  is	  that	  relational	  facts	  about	  my	  behavior	  need	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  relational	  facts	  about	  my	  mental	  states.	  For	  instance,	  my	  de	  re	  belief	  about	  Fido	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  is	  rotten	  explains	  why	  I	  pick	  it	  up	  and	  throw	  it	  in	  the	  trash.	  Opponents	  of	  externalist	  content	  claim	  that	  my	  behavior	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  general	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  a	  rotten	  apple	  in	  my	  environment	  together	  with	  the	  environmental	  fact	  that	  Fido	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  rotten	  apple	  in	  my	  environment.	  Arguably,	  however,	  we	  cannot	  preserve	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  relational	  facts	  about	  my	  mental	  states	  simply	  by	  conjoining	  intrinsic	  facts	  about	  my	  mental	  states	  with	  relational	  facts	  about	  my	  environment.24	  The	  final	  option	  is	  to	  reject	  the	  third	  premise	  by	  denying	  that	  full	  rationality	  requires	  believing	  all	  propositions	  that	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe.	  This	  is	  the	  option	  that	  I	  endorsed	  in	  previous	  work,	  although	  I	  now	  reject	  it	  for	  reasons	  that	  I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Farkas	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  there	  are	  semantic	  differences	  between	  singular	  terms	  and	  definite	  descriptions,	  but	  on	  her	  view,	  these	  semantic	  differences	  concern	  reference	  rather	  than	  content.	  The	  view	  is	  that	  content	  determines	  reference	  only	  relative	  to	  a	  context	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  reference	  is	  determined	  depends	  on	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  experience.	  23	  See	  Strawson	  1959,	  Putnam	  1975	  and	  Burge	  1979	  for	  examples	  of	  this	  kind.	  24	  Peacocke	  1993,	  Yablo	  1997,	  and	  Williamson	  2000:	  Ch.3	  develop	  this	  argument	  in	  more	  detail	  than	  I	  have	  space	  for	  here.	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will	  explain	  below.25	  On	  this	  view,	  one’s	  perceptual	  relations	  to	  the	  external	  world	  constrain	  which	  propositions	  one	  is	  able	  to	  believe,	  but	  not	  which	  propositions	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe.	  Thus,	  phenomenal	  duplicates	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  the	  very	  same	  propositions,	  although	  they	  differ	  in	  which	  justified	  beliefs	  they	  are	  able	  to	  hold.	  So,	  for	  example,	  I	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  Fifi	  as	  well	  as	  Fido,	  but	  I	  cannot	  use	  it	  in	  forming	  justified	  beliefs	  about	  Fifi	  because	  I	  don’t	  stand	  in	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  perceptual	  relation	  to	  Fifi.	  Williamson	  (2007)	  argues	  against	  a	  related	  proposal	  made	  by	  Audi	  (2001)	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  has	  the	  implausible	  consequence	  that	  one’s	  epistemic	  situation	  is	  always	  misleading.	  After	  all,	  it	  implies	  that	  I	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  many	  false	  propositions,	  including	  the	  de	  re	  proposition	  that	  Fifi	  is	  within	  reach.	  In	  response,	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  having	  justification	  to	  believe	  false	  propositions	  is	  sufficient	  for	  one’s	  epistemic	  situation	  to	  be	  misleading	  unless	  one	  is	  in	  danger	  of	  believing	  them.	  But	  in	  this	  case,	  I	  am	  in	  no	  danger	  of	  believing	  the	  false	  de	  re	  proposition	  that	  Fifi	  is	  within	  reach	  since	  I	  don’t	  stand	  in	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  perceptual	  relation	  to	  Fifi.	  Another	  consequence	  (noted	  by	  Nico	  Silins)	  is	  that	  I	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  inconsistent	  propositions	  –	  for	  instance,	  the	  de	  re	  proposition	  that	  Fido	  is	  the	  only	  apple	  within	  reach	  and	  the	  de	  re	  proposition	  that	  Fifi	  is	  the	  only	  apple	  that	  within	  reach.	  But	  this	  consequence	  is	  not	  intolerable.	  One	  of	  the	  lessons	  of	  Kripke’s	  (1979)	  puzzle	  about	  belief	  is	  that	  one	  can	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  inconsistent	  propositions	  so	  long	  as	  one	  lacks	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  are	  inconsistent.	  For	  example,	  Pierre	  believes	  that	  London	  is	  pretty	  and	  also	  believes	  that	  London	  is	  not	  pretty,	  but	  he	  is	  not	  thereby	  unjustified	  because	  he	  believes	  these	  propositions	  under	  different	  modes	  of	  presentation	  and	  so	  he	  lacks	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  are	  inconsistent.	  Similarly,	  if	  someone	  switches	  Fido	  and	  Fifi	  without	  my	  noticing,	  then	  I	  will	  believe	  inconsistent	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  Fido	  and	  Fifi,	  but	  I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See	  Smithies	  2006:	  27-­‐8	  and	  2014:	  112.	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Nico	  Silins	  and	  Alex	  Byrne	  for	  conversations	  that	  eventually	  led	  me	  to	  change	  my	  mind	  on	  this	  issue.	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am	  not	  thereby	  unjustified	  because	  I	  believe	  them	  under	  the	  same	  (or	  similar)	  mode	  of	  presentation	  and	  so	  I	  lack	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  are	  inconsistent.26	  In	  my	  view,	  the	  main	  problem	  with	  the	  third	  option	  is	  that	  it	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  an	  attractive	  principle	  linking	  forward-­‐looking	  and	  backward-­‐looking	  senses	  of	  rationality	  or	  justification	  in	  the	  epistemic	  domain:	  	  
The	  Linking	  Principle:	  if	  one	  is	  fully	  rational	  or	  justified	  in	  the	  backward-­‐looking	  sense,	  then	  one	  believes	  that	  p	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  sufficient	  reason	  or	  justification	  in	  the	  forward-­‐looking	  sense	  to	  believe	  that	  p.27	  	  In	  the	  practical	  domain,	  one	  may	  have	  sufficient	  justification	  for	  incompatible	  courses	  of	  action	  –	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Buridan’s	  ass	  –	  but	  rationality	  does	  not	  require	  taking	  all	  of	  them,	  since	  any	  one	  will	  do.	  But	  in	  the	  epistemic	  domain,	  it	  is	  much	  less	  plausible	  that	  one	  can	  have	  sufficient	  justification	  for	  conflicting	  doxastic	  attitudes.28	  The	  Linking	  Principle	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  I	  have	  justification	  for	  believing	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  Fifi,	  since	  my	  rationality	  is	  in	  no	  way	  impugned	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  do	  not	  stand	  in	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  perceptual	  relations	  to	  entertain	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  Fifi.	  I	  therefore	  conclude	  that	  Phenomenal	  Dependence	  is	  false.	  Phenomenal	  duplicates	  can	  differ	  in	  which	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  objects	  they	  have	  defeasible	  and	  non-­‐inferential	  justification	  to	  believe	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  owing	  to	  differences	  in	  their	  perceptual	  relations	  to	  the	  external	  world.	  In	  the	  next	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Another	  way	  to	  make	  essentially	  the	  point	  is	  that	  the	  externalist	  contents	  of	  these	  beliefs	  are	  inconsistent,	  but	  the	  phenomenal	  modes	  of	  presentation	  are	  consistent.	  See	  Chalmers	  2002	  for	  this	  diagnosis	  of	  Kripke’s	  puzzle.	  27	  The	  principle	  needs	  a	  qualification	  to	  deal	  with	  finkish	  cases	  in	  which	  believing	  a	  proposition	  destroys	  one’s	  justification,	  including	  Moorean	  conjunctions	  of	  the	  form,	  ‘p	  and	  I	  don’t	  believe	  that	  p’.	  But	  adding	  this	  qualification	  doesn’t	  solve	  the	  problem	  that	  I	  am	  raising	  here.	  28	  The	  debate	  in	  epistemology	  between	  uniqueness	  and	  permissiveness	  is	  relevant	  here.	  See	  the	  exchange	  between	  White	  2013	  and	  Kelly	  2013	  for	  further	  discussion.	  All	  I	  need	  here	  is	  intrapersonal	  (as	  distinct	  from	  interpersonal)	  uniqueness.	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section,	  I	  consider	  the	  consequences	  of	  this	  conclusion	  for	  the	  debate	  between	  internalism	  and	  externalism	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  perception.	  	  
4. Moderate	  versus	  Radical	  Externalism	  One	  dimension	  of	  the	  debate	  between	  internalism	  and	  externalism	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  perception	  concerns	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  externalist	  facts	  defined	  as	  facts	  about	  perception	  that	  are	  distinct	  from	  its	  phenomenal	  character.	  Internalism	  is	  defined	  here	  as	  the	  view	  that	  perception	  justifies	  belief	  solely	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  phenomenal	  character,	  while	  Externalism	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  view	  that	  perception	  justifies	  belief	  at	  least	  in	  part	  in	  virtue	  of	  externalist	  facts.	  Externalism	  can	  be	  further	  subdivided	  into	  moderate	  and	  radical	  versions.	  Moderate	  Externalism	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  view	  that	  externalist	  facts	  impact	  on	  the	  justificatory	  role	  of	  perception	  only	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  impact	  on	  its	  representational	  content,	  while	  Radical	  Externalism	  denies	  this.	  Moderate	  and	  Radical	  Externalism	  therefore	  disagree	  about	  whether	  the	  Content	  Principle	  is	  true.	  The	  argument	  against	  Phenomenal	  Dependence	  in	  section	  three	  establishes	  that	  Externalism	  is	  true	  and	  that	  Internalism	  is	  false:	  externalist	  facts	  about	  one’s	  perceptual	  relations	  to	  the	  external	  world	  impact	  on	  which	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  objects	  one	  has	  defeasible,	  non-­‐inferential	  justification	  to	  believe	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perceptual	  experience.	  My	  goal	  in	  this	  section	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  concession	  is	  consistent	  with	  Moderate	  Externalism	  and	  so	  does	  not	  force	  the	  acceptance	  of	  Radical	  Externalism.	  In	  sections	  five	  and	  six	  below,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  a	  stable	  and	  well-­‐motivated	  compromise.	  The	  version	  of	  Moderate	  Externalism	  that	  I	  propose	  relies	  upon	  a	  two-­‐level	  theory	  of	  representational	  content.	  Representationalism	  entails	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  phenomenal	  content	  –	  that	  is,	  it	  has	  some	  representational	  content	  that	  is	  identical	  with	  its	  phenomenal	  character.	  But	  I	  also	  maintain	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  externalist	  content	  –	  that	  is,	  it	  is	  has	  some	  representational	  content	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  and	  does	  not	  supervene	  upon	  its	  phenomenal	  character,	  but	  varies	  depending	  upon	  its	  relations	  to	  the	  external	  world.	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Here	  is	  a	  simple	  argument	  for	  this	  claim	  based	  on	  the	  example	  from	  Davies	  that	  we	  discussed	  in	  section	  three:	  	   (1) You	  and	  I	  are	  phenomenal	  duplicates	  who	  see	  distinct	  objects.	  (2) My	  perceptual	  experience	  represents	  the	  de	  re	  proposition	  that	  Fido	  is	  rotten,	  whereas	  your	  perceptual	  experience	  represents	  the	  de	  re	  proposition	  that	  Fifi	  is	  rotten,	  and	  not	  vice	  versa.	  (3) Therefore,	  our	  perceptual	  experiences	  have	  externalist	  contents	  that	  are	  distinct	  from	  and	  do	  not	  supervene	  upon	  their	  phenomenal	  character.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Davies	  explicitly	  rejects	  the	  second	  premise	  of	  this	  argument.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  representational	  content	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  existentially	  quantified	  content,	  rather	  than	  object-­‐involving	  content,	  precisely	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  supervenes	  upon	  phenomenal	  character	  alone:	  	   The	  perceptual	  content	  of	  experience	  is	  a	  phenomenological	  notion:	  perceptual	  content	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  how	  the	  world	  seems	  to	  the	  experiencer.	  If	  perceptual	  content	  is,	  in	  this	  sense,	  ‘phenomenological	  content’	  then,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  phenomenological	  difference	  for	  the	  subject,	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  in	  perceptual	  content.	  So	  if	  two	  objects	  are	  genuinely	  indistinguishable	  for	  a	  subject,	  then	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  of	  the	  one	  has	  the	  same	  content	  as	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  of	  the	  other.	  (Davies	  1997:	  314)	  	  But	  we	  can	  accept	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  phenomenal	  content	  without	  accepting	  that	  its	  representational	  content	  is	  exhausted	  by	  its	  phenomenal	  content.	  As	  far	  as	  I	  can	  see,	  there	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  to	  accept	  this	  further	  claim.	  Moreover,	  epistemological	  and	  explanatory	  considerations	  provide	  some	  good	  to	  reject	  it.	  If	  we	  follow	  Davies	  in	  assuming	  that	  belief	  represents	  de	  re	  propositions,	  then	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  resist	  the	  conclusion	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  does	  too.	  After	  all,	  we	  are	  sometimes	  justified	  in	  believing	  de	  re	  propositions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perceptual	  experience,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  perceptual	  experience	  can	  play	  this	  justifying	  role	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unless	  it	  represents	  those	  de	  re	  propositions.	  Why	  is	  it	  that	  my	  experience	  provide	  me	  with	  justification	  to	  believe	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  Fido,	  while	  your	  experience	  provides	  you	  with	  justification	  to	  believe	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  Fifi,	  and	  not	  vice	  versa?	  The	  most	  plausible	  answer	  is	  that	  my	  experience	  represents	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  Fido,	  while	  your	  experience	  represents	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  Fifi,	  and	  not	  vice	  versa.	  We	  can	  also	  give	  an	  explanatory	  argument	  for	  the	  same	  conclusion.	  Compare	  the	  explanatory	  argument	  we	  considered	  in	  section	  three	  for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  belief	  represents	  de	  re	  propositions.	  The	  argument	  was	  that	  relational	  facts	  about	  my	  behavior	  need	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  relational	  facts	  about	  my	  beliefs:	  for	  instance,	  my	  de	  re	  belief	  about	  Fido	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  is	  rotten	  explains	  why	  I	  pick	  it	  up	  and	  throw	  it	  in	  the	  trash.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  relational	  facts	  about	  my	  beliefs	  need	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  relational	  facts	  about	  perception:	  for	  instance,	  I	  believe	  the	  de	  re	  content	  that	  Fido	  is	  rotten	  because	  my	  perceptual	  experience	  represents	  that	  Fido	  is	  rotten.	  An	  opponent	  might	  claim	  that	  the	  explanatory	  work	  can	  be	  done	  by	  conjoining	  the	  fact	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  represents	  the	  general	  proposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  rotten	  apple	  before	  me	  with	  the	  relational	  fact	  that	  Fido	  is	  the	  rotten	  apple	  before	  me.	  But	  this	  faces	  the	  same	  objection	  as	  before:	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  we	  can	  preserve	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  relational	  facts	  about	  mental	  states	  by	  conjoining	  intrinsic	  facts	  about	  mental	  states	  with	  relational	  facts	  about	  the	  environment.	  So,	  there	  is	  no	  principled	  motivation	  for	  the	  view	  that	  de	  re	  propositions	  are	  represented	  in	  cognition	  but	  not	  perception.	  I	  conclude	  that	  perceptual	  experience	  represents	  both	  phenomenal	  and	  externalist	  contents.	  But	  the	  externalist	  contents	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  not	  wholly	  independent	  of	  its	  phenomenal	  contents.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  its	  externalist	  contents	  are	  indirect	  contents	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Silins	  defines	  below:	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A	  content	  that	  p	  of	  an	  experience	  is	  indirect	  if	  the	  experience	  has	  the	  content	  that	  p,	  and	  has	  the	  content	  that	  p	  at	  least	  in	  part	  in	  virtue	  of	  having	  some	  other	  content	  that	  q.29	  (Silins	  2011:	  354)	  	  Perceptual	  experience	  represents	  externalist	  contents	  in	  virtue	  of	  representing	  phenomenal	  contents	  in	  a	  specific	  environment.	  The	  phenomenal	  contents	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  impose	  substantial	  constraints	  on	  how	  its	  externalist	  contents	  are	  determined:	  they	  are	  determined	  in	  a	  way	  that	  depends	  on	  whether,	  and	  if	  so,	  how	  the	  external	  environment	  satisfies	  these	  constraints.30	  On	  this	  view,	  externalist	  content	  is	  partially	  grounded	  in	  phenomenal	  character.	  But	  there	  is	  no	  commitment	  to	  the	  further	  claim	  that	  externalist	  content	  is	  factorizable	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  can	  be	  given	  a	  conjunctive	  analysis	  in	  terms	  of	  phenomenal	  content	  together	  with	  relations	  to	  the	  external	  environment.31	  We	  can	  now	  explain	  an	  epistemic	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  externalist	  contents	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  and	  the	  externalist	  contents	  of	  unconscious	  perception	  in	  blindsight.	  What	  explains	  why	  the	  former	  and	  not	  the	  latter	  are	  justificational	  difference-­‐makers?	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  the	  externalist	  contents	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  are	  partially	  grounded	  in	  phenomenal	  character,	  whereas	  the	  externalist	  contents	  of	  unconscious	  perception	  in	  blindsight	  are	  not.	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  has	  a	  fundamental	  role	  to	  play	  in	  justifying	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  the	  sole	  factor	  that	  makes	  for	  justificational	  differences.	  On	  the	  view	  that	  I	  am	  proposing,	  perceptual	  experience	  provides	  justification	  to	  believe	  phenomenal	  contents	  solely	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  phenomenal	  character,	  but	  it	  also	  provides	  justification	  to	  believe	  externalist	  contents	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  phenomenal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Silins	  rejects	  the	  Content	  Principle,	  but	  he	  endorses	  a	  related	  thesis	  of	  Content	  Mediation:	  “When	  an	  experience	  has	  the	  indirect	  content	  that	  P,	  an	  experience	  can	  immediately	  justify	  you	  in	  believing	  that	  P	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  a	  phenomenal	  content	  of	  experience.”	  (2011:	  355)	  30	  These	  constraints	  are	  called	  “grounding	  presuppositions”	  in	  Horgan	  and	  Tienson	  2002	  and	  “conditions	  on	  extension”	  in	  Chalmers	  2004.	  31	  See	  Williamson	  2000:	  Chs.	  1-­‐3	  for	  arguments	  against	  factorizability.	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character	  together	  with	  its	  relations	  to	  the	  external	  world.	  Thus,	  externalist	  facts	  make	  an	  epistemic	  impact	  on	  the	  justificatory	  role	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  but	  only	  insofar	  as	  they	  bear	  on	  its	  representational	  content.	  They	  make	  no	  independent	  epistemic	  contribution	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  Radical	  Externalism	  claims.32	  The	  resulting	  view	  is	  a	  version	  of	  Moderate	  Externalism	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  Content	  Principle	  and	  so	  makes	  room	  for	  rejecting	  Internalism	  without	  embracing	  Radical	  Externalism.	  But	  is	  there	  any	  principled	  rationale	  for	  this	  compromise	  view?	  What	  is	  the	  motivation	  for	  allowing	  externalist	  facts	  to	  make	  an	  epistemic	  impact	  on	  perceptual	  justification	  for	  belief	  but	  only	  by	  way	  of	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  representational	  content	  of	  perception?	  In	  the	  next	  two	  sections,	  I	  address	  this	  challenge	  by	  invoking	  the	  epistemic	  level-­‐bridging	  principle	  that	  was	  introduced	  in	  section	  one.	  I	  argue	  in	  section	  five	  that	  Level	  Bridging	  is	  in	  tension	  with	  Radical	  Externalism	  and	  in	  section	  six	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  tension	  with	  Moderate	  Externalism.	  	  
5. Against	  Radical	  Externalism	  Radical	  Externalism	  comes	  in	  many	  different	  forms,	  including	  the	  following:	  	  
Reliabilism:	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  with	  the	  representational	  content	  that	  
p	  provides	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  only	  if	  it	  reliably	  indicates	  that	  p.33	  	  
Factivism:	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  with	  the	  representational	  content	  that	  p	  provides	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  only	  if	  one	  perceives	  that	  p,	  where	  this	  entails	  that	  it	  is	  a	  fact	  that	  p	  and	  (on	  some	  versions)	  that	  one	  knows	  or	  one	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  p.34	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  See	  also	  Conee	  and	  Feldman	  2004:	  82	  for	  a	  version	  of	  Moderate	  Externalism.	  Conee	  2007	  calls	  the	  view	  “externally	  enhanced	  internalism”.	  33	  Proponents	  of	  Reliabilism	  include	  Goldman	  1979,	  Sosa	  1991,	  Burge	  2003,	  Bergmann	  2006	  and	  Lyons	  2009.	  These	  authors	  disagree	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  reliability	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  justification.	  34	  Proponents	  of	  Factivism	  include	  McDowell	  1995,	  Williamson	  2007,	  Roessler	  2009,	  Littlejohn	  2012,	  Pritchard	  2012,	  and	  Schellenberg	  2013,	  this	  volume.	  
	   27	  
	  
Etiologism:	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  with	  the	  representational	  content	  that	  p	  provides	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  only	  if	  does	  not	  have	  a	  bad	  etiology,	  including	  certain	  kinds	  of	  cognitive	  penetration.35	  	  What	  these	  versions	  of	  Radical	  Externalism	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  they	  accept	  one	  direction	  of	  the	  Content	  Principle	  while	  rejecting	  the	  other.36	  On	  these	  views,	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  represents	  that	  p	  is	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  for	  it	  to	  provide	  defeasible,	  non-­‐inferential	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  In	  addition,	  further	  external	  conditions	  must	  be	  satisfied.	  Different	  versions	  of	  Radical	  Externalism	  impose	  different	  external	  conditions	  on	  the	  so-­‐called	  “good	  case”	  in	  which	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  
p	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  that	  represents	  that	  p.	  What	  all	  versions	  of	  Radical	  Externalism	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  there	  is	  some	  epistemic	  disparity	  between	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case.	  On	  simple	  versions,	  one	  has	  justification	  for	  belief	  in	  the	  good	  case	  but	  not	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  On	  more	  complex	  versions,	  one	  has	  justification	  for	  belief	  in	  both	  good	  and	  bad	  cases,	  but	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  with	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  good	  case	  than	  the	  bad	  case.37	  Either	  way,	  there	  is	  some	  belief	  or	  other	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  adopt	  in	  the	  good	  case	  but	  not	  the	  bad	  case.	  In	  order	  to	  simplify	  the	  discussion,	  I’ll	  ignore	  this	  complication	  in	  what	  follows.	  Here	  is	  a	  general	  form	  of	  argument	  against	  Radical	  Externalism:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Proponents	  of	  Etiologism	  include	  Siegel	  2011	  and	  McGrath	  2013.	  36	  Some	  versions	  of	  Radical	  Externalism	  reject	  both	  directions	  of	  the	  Content	  Principle,	  but	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  less	  radical	  versions	  of	  Radical	  Externalism,	  since	  my	  arguments	  will	  extend	  to	  more	  radical	  versions	  too.	  37	  Williamson	  2007	  holds	  that	  one	  has	  some	  degree	  of	  justification	  in	  the	  bad	  case,	  but	  more	  justification	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  Schellenberg’s	  2013	  distinction	  between	  phenomenal	  evidence	  and	  factive	  evidence	  has	  the	  same	  effect;	  see	  Schellenberg,	  this	  volume	  for	  further	  discussion.	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(1) If	  perceptual	  experience	  does	  not	  provide	  equal	  justification	  for	  belief	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case,	  then	  subjects	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  are	  less	  than	  fully	  justified	  insofar	  as	  they	  form	  the	  same	  beliefs	  as	  subjects	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  (2) Subjects	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  form	  the	  same	  beliefs	  as	  subjects	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  (3) Subjects	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  are	  fully	  justified.	  Therefore,	  (4) Perceptual	  experience	  provides	  equal	  justification	  for	  belief	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case.	  	  This	  argument	  makes	  explicit	  the	  reasoning	  that	  lies	  behind	  Cohen’s	  (1984)	  “new	  evil	  demon”	  problem	  for	  Reliabilism.	  Consider	  a	  phenomenal	  duplicate	  of	  mine	  who	  is	  a	  victim	  of	  an	  evil	  demon	  that	  deceives	  him	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  My	  phenomenal	  duplicate	  holds	  many	  (if	  not	  all)	  of	  the	  same	  beliefs	  that	  I	  do	  and	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  less	  justified	  than	  I	  am	  in	  holding	  those	  beliefs.	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  my	  perceptual	  experience	  provides	  equal	  justification	  for	  belief	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  a	  reliable	  guide	  to	  the	  external	  world.	  Cases	  of	  perceptual	  illusion	  and	  hallucination	  raise	  similar	  problems	  for	  Factivism.	  Suppose	  that	  Macbeth	  undergoes	  a	  “seamless	  transition”	  from	  the	  good	  case	  of	  perceiving	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him	  to	  the	  bad	  case	  of	  merely	  hallucinating	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him.	  The	  transition	  is	  “seamless”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Macbeth	  cannot	  know	  by	  introspection	  that	  the	  transition	  is	  occurring	  and	  it	  makes	  no	  relevant	  impact	  on	  his	  doxastic	  attitudes	  –	  in	  particular,	  he	  continues	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  dagger	  before	  him	  with	  the	  same	  high	  level	  of	  confidence.	  Factivism	  makes	  the	  implausible	  prediction	  that	  Macbeth	  is	  unjustified	  since	  he	  does	  not	  have	  justification	  for	  the	  same	  doxastic	  attitude	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case	  alike.	  And	  we	  can	  raise	  the	  same	  problem	  for	  Etiologism	  by	  considering	  seamless	  transitions	  between	  good	  and	  bad	  etiologies.	  Proponents	  of	  Radical	  Externalism	  sometimes	  reply	  to	  this	  objection	  by	  drawing	  a	  distinction	  between	  justification	  and	  blamelessness.	  The	  suggestion	  is	  that	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  one	  does	  not	  have	  justification	  for	  one’s	  beliefs,	  but	  one	  nevertheless	  has	  a	  good	  excuse	  for	  holding	  them	  –	  namely,	  that	  one	  is	  in	  a	  case	  that	  is	  indiscriminable	  by	  reflection	  from	  the	  good	  case.	  Since	  one	  has	  such	  an	  excuse,	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one	  cannot	  be	  blamed	  for	  forming	  these	  beliefs,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  one	  has	  justification	  for	  those	  beliefs.	  In	  the	  bad	  case,	  one	  is	  blameless,	  but	  unjustified.38	  Everyone	  should	  agree	  that	  blameless	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  justification.	  This	  is	  best	  illustrated	  by	  examples	  in	  which	  victims	  of	  brainwashing,	  drugs	  or	  mental	  illness	  form	  unjustified	  beliefs	  through	  no	  fault	  of	  their	  own.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  a	  patient	  with	  Capgras	  delusion	  who	  believes	  that	  his	  wife	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  an	  imposter.	  The	  belief	  is	  clearly	  unjustified	  but	  we	  do	  not	  blame	  the	  patient	  because	  he	  is	  delusional.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  seems	  quite	  wrong	  to	  assimilate	  cases	  of	  perceptual	  illusion	  and	  hallucination	  to	  the	  same	  category.	  These	  are	  cases	  of	  perceptual	  rather	  than	  cognitive	  impairment.	  There	  is	  distinction	  in	  respect	  of	  rational	  justification	  between	  the	  cognition	  of	  delusional	  patients	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  victims	  of	  perceptual	  illusion	  and	  hallucination	  on	  the	  other.	  We	  obscure	  this	  distinction	  insofar	  as	  we	  maintain	  that	  both	  are	  examples	  of	  blameless	  irrationality.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  point,	  we	  can	  follow	  Pryor	  (2001:	  117)	  in	  contrasting	  three	  victims	  of	  perceptual	  hallucination.	  The	  first	  is	  neither	  justified	  nor	  blameless:	  he	  recklessly	  forms	  beliefs	  that	  are	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  contents	  of	  experience	  as	  a	  result	  of	  carelessness.	  The	  second	  is	  blameless	  but	  not	  justified:	  he	  haplessly	  forms	  beliefs	  that	  are	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  contents	  of	  experience	  as	  a	  result	  of	  brainwashing.	  The	  third	  is	  not	  only	  blameless	  but	  also	  justified:	  he	  forms	  beliefs	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  contents	  of	  experience.	  The	  proposal	  under	  consideration	  collapses	  the	  distinction	  between	  false	  beliefs	  that	  are	  blameless	  because	  they	  are	  justified	  and	  false	  beliefs	  that	  are	  blameless	  despite	  being	  unjustified.39	  We	  can	  bolster	  the	  argument	  against	  Radical	  Externalism	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  epistemic	  level-­‐bridging	  principle	  that	  was	  introduced	  in	  section	  one:	  	  
Level	  Bridging:	  One	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  See	  Goldman	  1988,	  Williamson	  2007,	  Littlejohn	  2012,	  and	  Pritchard	  2012.	  39	  Littlejohn	  2012:	  44	  draws	  a	  distinction	  here	  between	  exemptions	  and	  excuses,	  but	  the	  distinction	  relies	  on	  a	  rejection	  of	  Level	  Bridging	  insofar	  as	  one	  has	  an	  excuse	  only	  if	  one	  has	  justification	  for	  believing	  falsely	  that	  one	  has	  justification.	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  The	  argument	  from	  Level	  Bridging	  is	  as	  follows.	  Part	  of	  what’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  that	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  falsely	  that	  one	  is	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  If	  Macbeth	  suffers	  a	  perfect	  hallucination	  of	  a	  dagger,	  then	  he	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  sees	  a	  dagger,	  rather	  than	  merely	  hallucinating	  one.	  Therefore,	  he	  has	  higher-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him.	  Given	  Level	  Bridging,	  it	  follows	  that	  he	  does	  in	  fact	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him.	  What	  are	  the	  options	  for	  blocking	  the	  argument?	  One	  option	  is	  to	  reject	  the	  right-­‐to-­‐left	  direction	  of	  Level	  Bridging.40	  On	  this	  view,	  Macbeth	  lacks	  first-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him,	  but	  he	  has	  second-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification.	  However,	  this	  view	  has	  implausible	  consequences	  that	  are	  familiar	  from	  the	  discussion	  in	  section	  one.	  The	  first	  implausible	  consequence	  is	  that	  Macbeth	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  one	  of	  the	  following	  Moorean	  conjunctions:	  	   (1) I	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  me,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  dagger	  before	  me;	  or	  (2) I	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  me,	  but	  it’s	  an	  open	  question	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  me.	  	  Intuitively,	  however,	  anyone	  who	  believes	  these	  Moorean	  conjunctions	  is	  thereby	  unjustified.	  And	  this	  is	  because	  no	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  them.	  The	  second	  implausible	  consequence	  is	  that	  Macbeth’s	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him	  is	  unjustified	  despite	  being	  suited	  to	  survive	  a	  fully	  justified	  process	  of	  critical	  reflection.	  After	  all,	  Macbeth	  has	  second-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification	  for	  the	  belief	  in	  question	  and	  so	  it	  is	  suited	  to	  survive	  a	  process	  whose	  aim	  is	  to	  bring	  one’s	  beliefs	  into	  conformity	  with	  one’s	  justified	  higher-­‐order	  reflections	  about	  what	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Notice	  that	  this	  option	  is	  hard	  to	  reconcile	  with	  Factivism:	  if	  justification	  is	  factive,	  then	  second-­‐order	  justification	  entails	  first-­‐order	  justification.	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But	  it	  is	  implausible	  that	  one	  lacks	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  that	  have	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  survive	  a	  fully	  justified	  process	  of	  this	  kind.	  The	  second	  option	  is	  to	  accept	  Level	  Bridging	  and	  to	  block	  the	  argument	  instead	  by	  rejecting	  the	  premise	  that	  Macbeth	  has	  second-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification.41	  On	  this	  view,	  Macbeth	  has	  neither	  first-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him	  nor	  second-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification.	  Of	  course,	  Macbeth	  holds	  these	  beliefs	  anyway.	  But	  what’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case	  on	  this	  view	  is	  that	  Macbeth	  is	  psychologically	  destined	  to	  hold	  beliefs	  for	  which	  he	  has	  no	  justification.	  This	  proposal	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  level-­‐bridging	  principle	  stated	  above.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  easily	  reconciled	  with	  a	  more	  general	  version	  of	  the	  principle	  whose	  application	  is	  extended	  from	  belief	  to	  other	  doxastic	  attitudes:	  	  
Extended	  Level	  Bridging:	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  adopt	  some	  doxastic	  attitude	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  adopt	  that	  doxastic	  attitude.	  	  Let’s	  assume	  for	  now	  (we’ll	  revisit	  this	  below)	  that	  Macbeth	  has	  justification	  to	  adopt	  some	  doxastic	  attitude	  towards	  the	  proposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him.	  Radical	  Externalism	  implies	  that	  he	  does	  not	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  it	  with	  as	  much	  confidence	  as	  he	  does	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  Instead,	  he	  has	  justification	  to	  either	  to	  disbelieve	  the	  proposition,	  to	  withhold	  belief,	  or	  to	  believe	  it	  with	  a	  lower	  degree	  of	  confidence.	  Given	  the	  left-­‐to-­‐right	  direction	  of	  Extended	  Level	  Bridging,	  it	  follows	  that	  he	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  justification	  to	  adopt	  one	  of	  these	  attitudes.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  Macbeth	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  is	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  But	  that	  is	  implausible.	  Part	  of	  what	  is	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  that	  one	  lacks	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  is	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  	  In	  response,	  one	  might	  insist	  that	  what’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  that	  one	  is	  psychologically	  incapable	  of	  conforming	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  epistemic	  justification.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  McDowell	  1982,	  1995	  and	  Pritchard	  2012	  combine	  Factivism	  with	  Level	  Bridging.	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On	  this	  view,	  Macbeth	  has	  first-­‐order	  justification	  to	  adopt	  certain	  doxastic	  attitudes,	  and	  second-­‐order	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  this	  first-­‐order	  justification,	  but	  he	  is	  unable	  to	  conform	  his	  doxastic	  attitudes	  accordingly.	  But	  this	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  bad	  case	  has	  at	  least	  two	  implausible	  consequences.	  The	  first	  bad	  consequence	  is	  that	  perceptual	  illusion	  or	  hallucination	  involves	  some	  rational	  defect	  in	  cognition.	  As	  I	  argued	  above,	  however,	  these	  are	  more	  plausibly	  regarded	  as	  cases	  of	  perceptual	  rather	  than	  cognitive	  impairment.	  What’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  not	  that	  one	  is	  cognitively	  irrational,	  but	  rather	  that	  cognitive	  rationality	  is	  destined	  to	  lead	  one	  into	  ignorance	  and	  error	  about	  the	  external	  world	  given	  one’s	  perceptual	  deficiencies.	  The	  second	  bad	  consequence	  is	  that	  a	  fully	  rational	  thinker	  is	  always	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  when	  she	  is	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  But	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  plausibly	  much	  worse	  than	  that:	  not	  even	  a	  fully	  rational	  thinker	  can	  know	  by	  reflection	  alone	  that	  she	  is	  having	  a	  perfect	  hallucination.	  And	  being	  fully	  rational	  does	  not	  guarantee	  that	  one	  has	  anything	  to	  rely	  on	  besides	  reflection.	  Even	  a	  naïve	  realist	  like	  Martin	  (2004)	  concedes	  that	  a	  perfect	  hallucination	  is	  indiscriminable	  by	  reflection	  from	  veridical	  perfection	  in	  an	  impersonal	  sense	  that	  abstracts	  away	  from	  the	  limited	  cognitive	  capacities	  of	  particular	  subjects.	  So	  the	  point	  holds	  as	  much	  for	  fully	  rational	  thinkers	  as	  it	  does	  for	  imperfectly	  rational	  thinkers	  like	  you	  and	  me.	  Any	  conception	  of	  rationality	  that	  denies	  this	  is	  hard	  to	  countenance.	  To	  avoid	  these	  problems,	  one	  might	  experiment	  with	  dropping	  the	  assumption	  that	  one	  always	  has	  justification	  to	  adopt	  some	  doxastic	  attitude	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  This	  is	  our	  third	  and	  final	  option.	  On	  this	  view,	  Macbeth	  lacks	  justification	  to	  adopt	  any	  doxastic	  attitude	  towards	  the	  proposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him.	  Moreover,	  he	  lacks	  justification	  to	  adopt	  any	  second-­‐order	  doxastic	  attitudes	  towards	  propositions	  about	  which	  first-­‐order	  doxastic	  attitudes	  he	  has	  justification	  to	  hold.	  These	  propositions	  are	  epistemically	  inert	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  no	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  he	  has	  justification	  to	  adopt	  towards	  them.	  As	  a	  result,	  Extended	  Level	  Bridging	  gets	  no	  application	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  But	  this	  option	  has	  its	  own	  implausible	  consequences.	  
	   33	  
First,	  there	  is	  no	  good	  precedent	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  these	  propositions	  are	  epistemically	  inert.	  Consider	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  number	  of	  books	  in	  my	  office	  is	  even.	  If	  you	  lack	  sufficient	  justification	  either	  to	  believe	  it	  or	  to	  disbelieve	  it,	  then	  you	  have	  sufficient	  justification	  to	  withhold.	  In	  general,	  withholding	  is	  justified	  by	  default	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  sufficient	  justification	  for	  belief	  or	  disbelief.	  To	  deny	  this	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  of	  illusion	  and	  hallucination	  seems	  ad	  hoc	  and	  unmotivated.42	  Second,	  we	  cannot	  give	  a	  purely	  negative	  explanation	  of	  what’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case	  in	  terms	  of	  epistemic	  inertness.	  Consider	  the	  epistemic	  predicament	  of	  someone	  who	  is	  temporarily	  comatose.	  They	  have	  no	  first-­‐order	  justification	  for	  adopting	  doxastic	  attitudes	  and	  they	  have	  no	  second-­‐order	  justification	  for	  believing	  that	  they	  have	  no	  first-­‐order	  justification.	  But	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  not	  at	  all	  like	  that.	  Admittedly,	  there	  are	  cognitive	  differences	  between	  these	  cases,	  since	  subjects	  form	  beliefs	  in	  a	  case	  of	  perceptual	  illusion	  and	  hallucination,	  but	  not	  in	  a	  comatose	  state.	  However,	  these	  cognitive	  differences	  fail	  to	  explain	  the	  relevant	  epistemic	  differences.	  Compare	  my	  epistemic	  predicament	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  with	  that	  of	  my	  temporarily	  zombified	  twin.	  We	  form	  the	  very	  same	  beliefs,	  but	  our	  epistemic	  predicament	  is	  nevertheless	  quite	  different	  in	  ways	  that	  cannot	  be	  captured	  in	  purely	  negative	  terms.	  What’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  not	  merely	  that	  one	  lacks	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  is	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  In	  addition,	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  falsely	  that	  one	  is	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  Finally,	  this	  option	  repeats	  the	  mistake	  of	  diagnosing	  what’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case	  in	  terms	  of	  cognitive	  irrationality.	  But	  now	  the	  guarantee	  of	  irrationality	  is	  not	  merely	  “medical”	  in	  the	  way	  that	  it	  was	  before.	  On	  the	  second	  option,	  we	  are	  psychologically	  destined	  to	  be	  irrational	  in	  the	  bad	  case	  but	  our	  more	  fully	  rational	  selves	  are	  not,	  since	  there	  is	  always	  some	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  we	  have	  justification	  to	  adopt	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  On	  the	  third	  option,	  in	  contrast,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  avoid	  irrationality	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  Just	  by	  virtue	  of	  considering	  the	  proposition	  one	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  adopt	  some	  doxastic	  attitude	  towards	  it	  –	  even	  if	  it	  is	  merely	  the	  attitude	  of	  not	  yet	  having	  made	  up	  one’s	  mind.	  But	  on	  this	  option,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  In	  section	  six,	  I	  explain	  why	  de	  re	  propositions	  don’t	  provide	  a	  good	  precedent.	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doxastic	  attitude	  that	  is	  justified.	  So	  the	  bad	  case	  is	  an	  epistemic	  dilemma	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  whatever	  doxastic	  attitude	  one	  adopts,	  it	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  be	  epistemically	  unjustified.	  Whatever	  you	  do,	  you	  just	  can’t	  win!	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  radical	  proponents	  of	  Radical	  Externalism	  will	  bite	  the	  bullet	  here.	  What’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case,	  they	  might	  say,	  is	  that	  it’s	  an	  epistemic	  dilemma	  in	  just	  this	  sense.	  My	  goal	  here	  is	  not	  so	  much	  to	  persuade	  them	  as	  to	  persuade	  a	  neutral	  audience	  that	  nothing	  so	  radical	  is	  forced	  upon	  us	  by	  rejecting	  internalism	  in	  the	  sense	  defined	  in	  this	  paper.	  So	  the	  task	  of	  the	  next	  section	  is	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  Moderate	  Externalism	  can	  avoid	  these	  radical	  commitments.	  	  
6. Moderate	  Externalism	  Defended	  In	  the	  previous	  section,	  I	  argued	  that	  Radical	  Externalism	  faces	  a	  dilemma.	  If	  Level	  Bridging	  is	  rejected,	  then	  it	  is	  committed	  to	  the	  implausible	  consequence	  that	  Moorean	  beliefs,	  along	  with	  other	  beliefs	  that	  are	  unstable	  under	  justified	  reflection,	  can	  be	  fully	  justified.	  But	  if	  Level	  Bridging	  is	  accepted,	  then	  it	  is	  committed	  to	  an	  implausible	  diagnosis	  of	  what’s	  bad	  about	  the	  bad	  case.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  argue	  that	  Moderate	  Externalism	  avoids	  this	  dilemma,	  since	  it	  can	  be	  reconciled	  with	  Level	  Bridging	  without	  thereby	  giving	  an	  implausible	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  bad	  case.	  If	  I	  am	  right	  about	  this,	  then	  Level	  Bridging	  provides	  a	  principled	  rationale	  for	  preferring	  Moderate	  Externalism	  to	  Radical	  Externalism.	  According	  to	  Radical	  Externalism,	  there	  are	  externalist	  requirements	  on	  epistemic	  justification	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  externalist	  conditions	  on	  mental	  content.	  These	  requirements	  are	  satisfied	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  violated	  in	  the	  bad	  case.	  Radical	  Externalism	  therefore	  entails	  that	  there	  are	  some	  propositions	  that	  I	  can	  entertain	  in	  the	  good	  case	  and	  the	  bad	  case	  alike,	  although	  I	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  them	  only	  in	  the	  good	  case.	  So,	  the	  following	  question	  arises:	  in	  the	  bad	  case,	  do	  I	  have	  justification	  to	  adopt	  some	  other	  doxastic	  attitude	  towards	  the	  proposition	  in	  question?	  If	  so,	  then	  Extended	  Level	  Bridging	  comes	  into	  effect	  with	  awkward	  results.	  But	  if	  not,	  then	  the	  proposition	  is	  epistemically	  inert	  for	  me	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  no	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  I	  have	  justification	  to	  adopt	  towards	  it.	  In	  that	  case,	  Extended	  Level	  Bridging	  does	  not	  come	  into	  effect.	  But	  the	  result	  is	  an	  epistemic	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dilemma:	  once	  I	  consider	  the	  proposition	  in	  question,	  I	  cannot	  avoid	  adopting	  any	  attitude	  at	  all,	  and	  so	  I	  am	  guaranteed	  to	  adopt	  a	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  is	  unjustified.	  According	  to	  Moderate	  Externalism,	  there	  are	  externalist	  requirements	  on	  mental	  content	  but	  no	  further	  externalist	  requirements	  on	  epistemic	  justification.	  So,	  for	  example,	  one	  cannot	  represent	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  an	  object	  unless	  one	  stands	  in	  some	  appropriate	  relation	  –	  such	  as	  a	  perceptual	  relation	  –	  to	  the	  object.	  But	  there	  are	  no	  further	  externalist	  requirements	  that	  one	  must	  satisfy	  in	  order	  to	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  de	  re	  propositions	  about	  the	  object.	  Let’s	  define	  the	  really	  bad	  case	  as	  one	  that	  violates	  externalist	  requirements	  for	  entertaining	  certain	  propositions.	  In	  the	  really	  bad	  case,	  I	  cannot	  represent	  those	  propositions	  at	  all.	  Moreover,	  my	  inability	  to	  represent	  these	  propositions	  is	  no	  reflection	  of	  my	  limited	  rationality.	  Therefore,	  it	  follows	  from	  the	  Linking	  Principle	  (see	  section	  three)	  that	  these	  propositions	  are	  epistemically	  inert	  for	  me	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  are	  no	  doxastic	  attitudes	  that	  I	  have	  justification	  to	  adopt	  towards	  them.	  Moderate	  Externalism	  therefore	  entails	  that	  there	  are	  propositions	  that	  I	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  good	  case	  but	  not	  the	  really	  bad	  case.	  How	  does	  Moderate	  Externalism	  avoid	  the	  dilemma	  for	  Radical	  Externalism?	  Extended	  Level	  Bridging	  does	  not	  come	  into	  effect	  because	  these	  propositions	  are	  epistemically	  inert	  for	  me	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  no	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  I	  have	  justification	  to	  adopt	  towards	  them.43	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  no	  threat	  of	  epistemic	  dilemma	  since	  I	  cannot	  represent	  these	  propositions	  in	  the	  really	  bad	  case	  and	  so	  I	  am	  unable	  to	  violate	  epistemic	  standards	  by	  adopting	  some	  unjustified	  doxastic	  attitude.	  Therefore,	  both	  horns	  of	  the	  dilemma	  are	  avoided.	  To	  illustrate,	  take	  the	  bad	  case	  in	  which	  Macbeth	  hallucinates	  a	  dagger	  and	  consider	  the	  general	  proposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dagger	  before	  him.	  Suppose	  Macbeth	  does	  not	  have	  justification	  to	  adopt	  the	  same	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  he	  does	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Epistemically	  inert	  propositions	  provide	  counterexamples	  to	  an	  unrestricted	  version	  of	  the	  J~J	  Principle,	  which	  states	  that	  one	  lacks	  justification	  to	  believe	  a	  proposition	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  lacks	  justification	  to	  believe	  it	  (see	  Smithies	  2012a).	  But	  given	  plausible	  assumptions,	  the	  Extended	  Level	  Bridging	  principle	  entails	  a	  version	  of	  the	  J~J	  Principle	  that	  is	  restricted	  to	  propositions	  that	  are	  not	  epistemically	  inert.	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good	  case.	  Is	  there	  some	  other	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  he	  has	  justification	  to	  adopt	  towards	  this	  proposition	  in	  the	  bad	  case?	  If	  so,	  then	  Extended	  Level	  Bridging	  comes	  into	  effect	  with	  awkward	  results.	  But	  if	  not,	  then	  the	  case	  is	  an	  epistemic	  dilemma,	  since	  Macbeth	  cannot	  avoid	  adopting	  some	  doxastic	  attitude	  towards	  this	  proposition	  as	  soon	  as	  he	  considers	  it.	  Now	  consider	  a	  de	  re	  proposition	  about	  some	  particular	  object	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  is	  a	  dagger.	  The	  same	  dilemma	  does	  not	  arise.	  Suppose	  Macbeth	  does	  not	  satisfy	  the	  externalist	  conditions	  for	  being	  able	  to	  entertain	  this	  proposition	  and	  that	  his	  inability	  to	  do	  so	  reflects	  no	  rational	  failing	  on	  his	  part.	  The	  Linking	  Principle	  entails	  that	  there	  is	  no	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  he	  has	  justification	  to	  adopt	  towards	  this	  proposition.	  So	  Extended	  Level	  Bridging	  does	  not	  come	  into	  effect.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  no	  epistemic	  dilemma	  because	  Macbeth	  is	  unable	  to	  adopt	  doxastic	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  proposition.	  	  
7. Conclusion	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  perception	  justifies	  belief	  about	  the	  external	  world	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  phenomenal	  character	  together	  with	  its	  relations	  to	  the	  external	  world.	  But	  these	  perceptual	  relations	  to	  the	  external	  world	  impact	  on	  the	  justifying	  role	  of	  perception	  only	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  impact	  on	  its	  representational	  content.	  Moreover,	  the	  epistemic	  level-­‐bridging	  principle	  provides	  a	  principled	  rationale	  for	  avoiding	  more	  radically	  externalist	  theories	  of	  perceptual	  justification.44	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